

POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND THE MILITARY: A MATERIALIST ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

This study frowns at the idea of an apolitical military which is completely ahistorical. Philosophising and theorising an apolitical military is a complete negation of the dictum that war is politics or policy by other means. The disposition in African and most of the Third World to an apolitical military is a product of the Cold War politics and a struggle among the then Western and Eastern blocs' competition for world hegemony. This study has taken a historical swipe on the place of the military in historical states from antiquity to the modern states. We have found out that the military is central to the survival of the state whether in the slave states, the feudal states, now the capitalist states and in whatever form whether democratic or autocratic. We discovered that from the slave state to the absolute monarchy of the nascent capitalist state, the military was central in the political process hence the heads of such states were equally their military heads, such as, emperors and kings.

This was gradually replaced by the modern democratic system in which the military being restricted to its rightful professional dynamics does not abandon the state, politics and democracy. It supports and protects the state in politics and democracy since the emergence of property franchise, taxpaying franchise, adult male franchise to the current universal suffrage. It has only been partisan in protecting class power and not in active political contest or direct involvement in politics. Hence in modern democratic dispensation, the military is subject to civil control or authority to defend and secure society and its political framework for the survival of the state. No more! No less!!

KEYWORDS: *Democracy, Military, Egalitarianism, Antagonism, Gentile*

*History is important because if you don't know history it is as if you
were born yesterday and if you were born yesterday anybody up
there and in position of power can tell you anything*

– Howard Zinn –

They who have put out the peoples eyes reproach them of blindness

– John Milton, 1642 –

Propaganda is to democracy What violence is to a dictatorship

– Noam Chomsky –

INTRODUCTION

Politics is a game of power play. This game of power cannot be properly comprehended without a thorough understanding of the science of societal power relations in which the military is strategically located. The confusion between the science of society and its politics is a product of the fetters placed on society by the prevailing ideology of power relations on social scientific knowledge. This is to make the dominated classes incapable of greater scientific comprehension of the prevailing dominant social order both nationally and internationally. It is only with a thorough grasp of the science of society that one could be able to have a clear vision of the historical development of power relations or

politics, the historical emergence of the state, the military and later democracy. It will equally afford us to know how societies transform in the historical process and the development of different social formations or the different states.

Prior to the birth of the state and indeed the military as a profession, politics was based on mother right or the rule of the mother anchored in primitive communal system. It was also an egalitarian society without social classes or division in society. As such there were no antagonistic relations but relations based on biological or blood ties anchored on mother rights. The relics of this society still remain with us today. Such are the cases of Ghana's matrilineal system and the Ejagham system here in Nigeria. In the case of the Ejagham, on a man's death his children will not inherit his property. Rather, his property went to his mother's surviving eldest son or in the alternative to his sister's eldest surviving son (Tangban 2008:22). Engels (1977) based a whole of one of his seminal works on mother rights and how father rights based on the emergence of private property overthrew mother rights to herald a climb to civilisation and indeed the dynamics of power relations or politics. This resulted in the transformation of the gentile constitution based on egalitarianism of a naturally-grown democracy into a hateful aristocracy.

The naturally-grown democracy of the gentile constitution had grown out of society that knew no internal contradictions, and was adapted only for such a society. It had no coercive power except public opinion. However, a society had come into being by force of all its economic conditions of existence, had to split up into free men and slaves, into exploited poor and exploiting rich, a society that was not only incapable of reconciling these antagonisms, but had to drive them more and more to a head (Engels 1977:165). The reconciliation of these antagonistic relations since civilisation has been the basis of politics and indeed democratic politics in the contemporary historical period. The role of the military can only be properly understood within this materialist historical struggle. How do we see the military historically and what has been its place in material transformation? What has been the place of the military in the historical power play in pre-democratic antiquity and post-antiquity democratic struggles or politics? In the historical emergence of the state, what role did the change concepts of defence and strategic thought play in the new post-mother rights or pristine order? How did this role negate the naturally-grown democracy of the gentile order? One can only comprehend the forgoing puzzles from the dialectics and dynamics of world historical process.

THE STATE, POLITICS AND THE MILITARY IN THE WORLD HISTORICAL PROCESS

It was Thomas Hobbes in his *Leviathan* who said that the state of nature was a very hostile one because there were no industry, no arts, "no society (no community – my emphasis); and which is worst of all, initial fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short" (cited in Nisbet 1983:27). It was for this reason of endemic and internecine conflict or turmoil which made men to surrender their individual authority to a central sovereign which became a monopoly of force or the state in his time based on the absolute monarchy. However, Marxian literature provides us with the source of this monopoly of force which is said to be a product of the irreconcilable class antagonism in post-pristine society. Thomas Hobbs, John Locke, Jean-jarques Rousseau and other liberal thinkers posit the monopoly of force or social contract as the quintessence of the state (Frolov 1984:385).

The classical theorists of the state from antiquity see the state as a teleological growth from the individual, the family, the community to the state. Thus they saw the state as the quintessence of man. They did not mention the state as a monopoly of force as their modern European incarnates of the 16th, 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. However, something similar which is the guardian (or soldier) was seen as quite central to the sustenance of the state (Plato; 1979). The liberal societies of Western Europe and North America have not grown beyond the idea of a *social contract* or a centralised

sovereign or the institution of the monopoly of force. Engels (1978:196) said, “The idea that political acts, grand performances of the state, are decisive in history is as old as written history itself and is the main reason why so little material has been preserved for us in regard to the really progressive evolution of the peoples which has taken place quietly, in the background, behind these noisy scenes on the stage.”

Apart from the *theorists of social contract*, there is also the theory of the divine origin of the state. This theory belongs to the Middle Ages spearheaded by Saint Augustine and later by Thomas Aquinas. According to Nisbet (1983:97), “Society was conceived by the medieval philosophers as a great chain of being ranging from the simplest organism at the bottom all the way to God at the top, and each link, however humble, was deemed vital in the divine chain.” Lenin (1985:76-7) said, to this day the question of the state has often been confused with religious questions, building a doctrine very often complex one with ideological, philosophical approach and argumentations.

It claims that the state is something divine, something supernatural, that it is a certain force by virtue of which mankind lives. It is seen as a force of divine origin which confers on people, or can confer on people, or which brings with it something that is not of man but is given to him from without or above. Lenin (1985:77) stressed:

The most reliable thing in question of social science and one thing that is most necessary in order really to acquire the habit of approaching this question correctly and not allowing oneself to get lost in the mass of detail or in the immense variety of conflicting opinions – the most important thing if one is to approach this question scientifically, is not to forget the underlying historical question, but to examine every question from the standpoint of how the given phenomenon arose in history and what were the principal stages in its development, to examine what it has become today.

The correct approach to the question of the state was posited by Frederick Engels in his seminal work, *Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*. “It begins with the historical sketch of the origin of the state... it should first of all be noted that the state has not always existed. There was a time when there was no state. It appears wherever and whenever a division of society into classes appears” (Lenin, 1985:78). According to Engels (1977:170):

The state, then, had not existed from all eternity. There have been societies that did without it, that had no idea of the state and state power. At a certain stage of economic development, which was necessarily bound up with the split of society into classes, the state became a necessity owing to this split.

Thus Engels (1977:166) Concludes That

The state is therefore, by no means a power forced on society from without. Rather it is a product of society at certain stage of development. It is the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it has split into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel. But in order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interest, might not consume themselves and society in fruitless struggle, it becomes necessary to have power seemingly standing above society that would alleviate the conflict and keep it within the bounds of “order”, and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and alienating itself more and more from it is the state.

The state has always been a certain apparatus which stood outside society and consisted of a group of people engaged solely, or almost solely, or mainly in ruling. People are divided into the ruled, and into specialists in ruling, those

who rose above society are called rulers, the statesmen. This apparatus, this group of people who rule others, always possess certain means of coercion, of physical force. This is irrespective of whether this violence over people is expressed in the epoch of slavery, or in the fire-arms which appeared in the Middle Ages or, finally in modern weapons, which in the twentieth century are technical marvels and are based entirely on the latest achievement of modern technology (Lenin, 1985:82). This institution of physical force or so-called *social contract* is quite impossible without an apparatus which compels the slaves to remain in slavery, which kept one part of society subjected to and oppressed by the other. It is quite impossible to compel the greater part of society to work systematically for other part of society without a permanent apparatus of coercion (Lenin, 1985:83).

The state's main features are: first, the division of subjects according to territory which is a common feature to all states. The second distinguishing feature is the establishment of public power which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as an armed force. This special, public power became very necessary, because a self-acting armed organisation of the population has become impossible since the split of society into irreconcilable class antagonistic relations. In Athens, the free citizens were 90,000 as against 365,000 slaves. As such, the people's army of Athenian democracy was an aristocratic public power against the slaves. The public power exists in every state which consists not merely of armed men but also of gendarmerie (or police) and other material adjuncts, prisons and institutions of coercion of all kinds, of which gentile society knew nothing (Engels, 1977:167).

The fact remains that Western societies see politics as the resolution of conflicts between groups and among groups in society hence the idea of "conflict and consensus" in their political and sociological thoughts (Peil 1977). This is the politics in Western societies, the idea is the resolution of conflict to create a balance, equilibrium or consensus. Weber (1947:145-54) and others understood politics to mean striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power either among states or among groups within a state.

In the same vein Dahl (1963:6) said, "A political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to a significant extent, power, rule or authority." Easton (1965:50) defines politics as "the authoritative allocation of values." Although Omoruyi (1983:10) agrees more with David Easton than with Max Weber and Robert A. Dahl, he noted that the former: "...is unable to treat seriously the most important political consideration – namely, what moulds the value themselves? Where do these values come from? We know that this is what political struggles are all about but the substantive content of the value, is itself perhaps the most important single determinant of what the authoritative allocation will be."

According to Peil (1977:4) "...values can pose a serious problem for the scientist... because it is always hard... to study behaviours in a neutral way. We are all biased by our values and this means that we often ignore what Weber calls the "inconvenient fact". One is mindful of the fact that we always defend the indefensible. Such is a product of what Oyavbaire (1983:239-54) calls the "tyranny of borrowed paradigm" or received ideas. Our lengthy theoretical exposition of the sources of the monopoly of force and indeed of power and politics is meant to nip in the bud those who will spring on their feet to defend the indefensible. What then was the role of the military in the various types of states in antiquity and the Middle Ages in the historical process? Has that role changed in the liberal democratic struggles in its various forms from property franchise, through adult male suffrage to the current universal franchise? Here we shall be content with the role of the military in politics and indeed state building from the slave states, through the feudal states of the Middle Ages to the absolute monarch of nascent capitalism and to current liberal democratic capitalist states.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICS IN PRE-LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES

We now return to the centralised sovereignty or the monopoly of force. In the words of Lenin (1985:83-4) force is impossible without permanent apparatus to compel the servile part of society to acquiescence. As there was no antagonistic class divisions in primeval societies prior to slavery there were no apparatus of this nature. However, when classes appeared, irreconcilable antagonisms appeared, everywhere and always. In antiquity as this division grew and took firmer hold, there also appeared a special institution – the state. The forms of states varied and were diverse even in ancient Greece and Rome that were then the most advance in culture and civilisation based entirely on slavery. According to Lenin (1985:84):

At that time there was already a difference between monarchy and republic, between aristocracy and democracy. A monarchy is the power of a single person, a republic is the absence of any non-elected authority; an aristocracy is the power of relatively small minority, a democracy is the power of the people (democracy in Greece literally means the power of the people). All these differences arose in the epoch of slavery. Despite these differences, the state in slave-owning epoch was a slave-owning state, irrespective of whether it was a monarchy or a republic, aristocratic or democratic.

The foregoing varieties of the state forms were the forms of the monopoly of force or *social contract*. The centralisation of power or authority is fundamental to all states which liberal scholars say is the key to understanding the state and politics. In Fredrick Engel's definition of the state, he posited that the state was not forced on society from above but a product of insoluble and indeed irreconcilable contradictions as society split into irreconcilable antagonisms of conflicting economic interests.

It was these crises of interest between the dominant and the dominated classes that forced the dominant classes to impose their authority over society which is the state or social formation or the superstructure. In this respect, therefore, the "monopoly of force" which liberal scholars say is *social contract* is nothing but the power of the dominant economic classes to rule the dominated classes. However, we have been informed that there are in the foregoings various forms of such organisations of state power in antiquity and in the Middle Ages in Europe which were thoroughly studied by progressive historians, social scientist and indeed philosophers (Engles 1977).

Engels (1977:168) noted that, "Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but because it arose at the same time, in the midst of the conflict of these classes, it is as a rule, the state of the most powerful, economically dominant, which, through the medium of the state, becomes also the politically dominant class, and thus acquires new means of holding down and exploiting the oppressed classes."

This instrument of holding down the vast majority of the society to the whims and caprices of the dominant class or political force as we have seen is the state. However, the state or social formation has never been neutral because it is based on material property relations. From the primitive communal system or primitive communism the relations of production was based on collective ownership of the means of production. In the slave system after the overthrow of the egalitarianism of the gentile order, the relations of production became antagonistic because of slavery or ownership of slaves. In the feudal epoch, the ownership of land by the aristocracy became the order of the day.

The transformation of the primitive communal system from a naturally-grown democracy to a hateful aristocracy was a product of the division of labour that breached the gentile constitution prior to the emergence of civilisation. The gentile constitution of primeval society was based on the relations of production of subsistent economy. Equally, their

security strategy was based on the *strategy of the armed people*. However, with the emergence of class power or the state, this *strategy of the armed people* or the population organising itself as an armed force became increasingly impossible. In its place the nascent professional military arose that became the inner dynamics of class power or the state. Thus the collapse of the gentile constitution based on egalitarianism led to the collapse of its democratic defence or *the strategy of the armed people*. Engels (1977:160-1) said that under maturing gentile constitution:

The popular assembly was instituted wherever it did not exist. The military commander, the council and the popular assembly formed the organs of military democracy into which the gentile society had developed. A military democracy because war and organisation for war was now regular functions of the life of the people. The wealth of their neighbours excited the greed of the peoples who began to regard acquisition of wealth as one of their main purposes in life. They were barbarians: plunder appeared to them easier even more honorably than productive work. War, once waged simply to avenge aggression or as a means of enlarging territory that had become inadequate, was now waged for the sake of plunder alone, and became a regular profession.

With the emergence and increasing institution of public power, the robber wars for slaves and material riches increased the power of the supreme commanders as well as sub-commanders. The customary election of successors from one family, especially after the appearance of father right, was gradually transformed into hereditary succession, first tolerated, then claimed and finally usurped. Thus the foundation for hereditary royalty and hereditary nobility was laid. In this respect, the organs of the gentile constitution were gradually torn from its democratic roots in the people, in gens, phratry and tribe, and the whole gentile order was transformed into its opposite. It was turned from the organisation of tribes for the free administration of their own affairs; it became an organisation for plundering and oppressing their neighbours. Correspondingly, its organs were transformed from instruments of the will of the people into the independent organs of public power for ruling and oppressing their own people (Engels, 1977:161). This was the historical origin of the military profession and indeed the institution of public power as organs standing above society – the state or the superstructure.

The state apparatus has been a dominant instrument that forces the obedience to one class of the other subordinated classes. It has been through history the state of property owners against the propertiless classes. This was the historical origin of the property franchise. We have noted earlier that there are various forms of the state machine. The various forms of government in the various historical epochs vary extremely, but their essence was always the same. The slaves enjoyed no rights in the slave states and constituted an oppressed class, they were not regarded as human beings. It was the same thing in the feudal state. This is of immense importance. The peasant-serf was tied to the soil as such the essence of class society remained – society was based on class exploitation. Only the owners of the land could enjoy full rights; the peasant-serf had no rights at all. In practice their condition differed very little from the condition of slaves in the slave-owning states of antiquity (Lenin 1985:85).

The monopoly of force was not only a product of the liberal state of the post-Middle Ages epoch of capitalism. It has been a basic necessity for all states throughout history since the collapse of the primeval order or the primitive communal system of barbarism or pre-civilisation. It has been a product of the emergence of the state and since the overthrow of mother rights by father rights. Also it has been a product of material advancement and the enthronement of property rule and indeed the rule of wealth. The rule of property owners would not have been possible without the dissolution of the gentile constitution and its *security strategy of the armed people*. We have noted that the second

distinguishing feature of the state is the establishment of the institution of *public power* which no longer directly coincides with the population organising itself as armed force. This special public power became necessary, because a self-acting armed organisation of the population had become impossible since the split of society into classes (Engels 1977:167).

Lenin (1985:86) said, “Neither under slavery nor under feudal system could a small people dominate over the vast majority without coercion. History is full of the constant attempts of the oppressed classes to throw off oppression.” The emergence of the state and its rule of politics based on “power, rule and authority” could not have been possible without a coercive force. Somewhere politics is defined as the “power of A to make B do what the latter would not ordinarily have done.” This compelling power has three sources: (i) the military with other security agencies; (ii) the control of the economy such as craft, handicrafts, industries or the means of production or property relations, and (iii) the ideological and the philosophical through which the ruling circle confuses the ruled masses to stupor. Of all the three, the military with other security agencies stand out as the guardian of the state in whatever form.

POLITICS, DEMOCRACY AND THE MILITARY IN DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

Democracy and its politics of representative electoral process are still transitional even in the advance democracies of the world. It is not yet the *End of History* as Francis Fukuyama would make us believe. Amin (2009:6-7) said, “Democracy is modern concept in the sense that it is the very definition of modernity – if... we understand by modernity the adoption of the principle that human beings individually and collectively (that is societies) are responsible for their destiny. Before they could formulate that concept, people had to free themselves from the alienations characteristic of the forms of power that preceded capitalism, whether they were the alienations of religion or whether they took the form of “traditions” conceived as permanent transhistorical facts. The expressions of modernity, and of the necessity for democracy that it implies dates from the age of enlightenment. The modernity in question is, therefore, synonymous with capitalism and democracy that it has produced is limited like the rest, like capitalism itself. In its historical bourgeois forms – even though they are the only ones known and practiced so far – it constitutes only a “stage”. Neither modernity nor democracy has reached the end of its potential development. This is why Samir Amin said, he prefers the term *democratisation*, which stresses the dynamic aspect of a still-unfinished process to the term “democracy”, which reinforces the illusion that we can give a definitive formula for it (Amin 2009:6-7).

Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer (1998:15-16) said, “the first wave of democratisation was long and slow-moving, and did not reach very far. It was launched by the late eighteenth-century American and French revolutions. France gave the vote to all men in 1792, but then oscillated between democratic and undemocratic regimes. The United States abolished slavery only during the Civil War in 1863 and did not effectively guarantee blacks the vote until the 1960s. Before the First World War the dominant European powers were undemocratic states. The second wave of democratisation came after the Second World War. The third wave of democratisation began in the Mediterranean in 1974, with the overthrow of an authoritarian Portuguese regime and the collapse of the colonels’ regime in Greece.” The first wave as we have seen in the foregoing did not give us the various phases of earlier democratic transitions in the liberal democratic societies. According to Cilliers (1996:86), a vital part of this process, at least in Europe, was the military elite’s transfer of its allegiance from monarchy to the new political regimes in the nineteenth century.”

Jakkie Cilliers talks of this transition as if it was voluntarily given by the dominant classes of the nobility to the entire society or the emergent bourgeoisie. Marx (1978:11) described this period thus: “But unheroic as bourgeois society is, it nevertheless took heroism, sacrifice, terror, civil war and the battles of nations to bring it into being.” In England the

revolution of the 17th century was between the absolute monarchy of King Charles, a combination of the feudal aristocracy, the landed gentry of the old feudal order on the one hand and the parliamentarians (emerging capitalists – my emphasis) under Oliver Cromwell on the other hand (Hill 1983:64-5). According to Stone (1972:71-6) “...although there were no clean cut split of social forces along class lines, but relations changed along the operations of the market. Therefore the point of no return was reached when the old relations based on feudalism or feudal nobility could no longer hold sway. Stone (1972:71-72) further stressed:

What can be said, however, is that these economic developments were dissolving old bonds of service and obligation (feudal relations – my emphasis) and creating new relationships founded on the operations of the market, and the domestic and foreign policies of the Stuarts were failing to respond to these changing circumstances. Much of the political friction of the early seventeenth century was generated by resentments, jealousies and tensions arising from the rise of wealth of new social groups and the decline of others, and by the fumbling and corrupt way in which the administration handled the situation.

From the great French Revolution of 1789 of Napoleon Bonaparte there had been revolutions and counter-revolutions in France. The French Revolution and that of the United States of the 19th century are what we have noted as the first wave of democratisation in modern state system (Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer 1998). The military has been a part of this democratic revolutionary transition from the old feudal nobility to the nascent capitalist class based on the new relations of production of liberalism or capitalism. The process was initially liberal in the economic market place but not in the political. According to Macpherson (1973:5):

In our Western societies the democratic franchise was not installed until after the liberal society and the liberal state were firmly established. Democracy came as a top dressing. It had to accommodate itself to the soil that had already been prepared by the operation of the competitive, individualist, market society, and by the operation of the liberal state, which served that society through a system of freely competing, though not democratic political parties. It was the liberal state that was democratised, and in the process, democracy was liberalised.

According to CB Macpherson, “Democracy originally meant rule by the common people, the plebeians. It was very much a class affair: it meant the sway of the lowest and the largest class. That is why it was feared and rejected by men of learning, men of substance, men who valued civilised ways of life. Democracy as a leveling doctrine was rejected by Plato in the fifth century B.C, and no less explicitly by Cromwell in the Seventeenth Century A.D. It was even rejected by Cromwell’s left-wing allies in the English Civil War, the so-called Levellers who split from him on the issue of who is to have the vote. Even they did not think of extending the vote to the two-third of the nation who were either wage-earners, or recipients of poor relief, or both. Such men they held, were dependent on others, and so not entitled to a political voice” (Macpherson 1973:5-6). This gave rise to property qualification in the 18th century, an extension of the feudal relations of production. In France, property qualification was supplanted by tax paying qualification in 1814 and that in turn gave way to manhood or adult male suffrage in 1848. In Britain, property qualifications were relaxed in the reform Acts of 1867 and 1884 (Ayoade, 1975).

The state as we have seen in liberalism was prior to the politics of that social formation which was based on material property relations hence property franchise. As Plato and Aristotle saw the guardian or military as the

quintessence of the Greek city states, it was the same thing through the Middle Ages and indeed the emergent nascent liberal state even today. Cilliers (1996:86) noted thus:

In Western Europe and the United States, unlike Africa, military institutions were of central importance in fashioning the type of nation – state that emerged. Starting with the American and French revolutions, military service came to be seen as an integral part of republican citizenship. In the nation-states of the West, widespread (albeit not universal) reliance on compulsory national military service played a role in shaping the predominant conception of citizenship, as did such well known social processes of industrialisation, urbanisation and modernisation generally.

Janowitz (1975:71-6, 83) observed that, “Modern military institutions and modern parliamentary institutions arose simultaneously in the industrialised West. Military service (or at least eligibility for such service if needed) became a hallmark of citizenship, and citizenship became a hallmark of democracy. Moreover, the citizen army backed by civilian reservists served not only as shield against foreign enemies and an instrument of national will, but also as a means for keeping the professional military class under political control.” We have noted earlier how in Europe the military elite transferred its allegiance from monarchy to the emergent liberal regimes in the nineteenth century. The foregoing was not the same thing in some other nation-states of later industrialisation such as Japan and Russia, not to talk of the developing countries. These states bear little resemblance to what happened in the earlier states of industrialisation (Cilliers 1996:86) where militaries shifted allegiance to the emergent liberal states and thus subjected themselves under political control.

From antiquity or slave-owning states to the feudal states of the Middle Ages, the division of labour had not advanced to allow the head of administration to leave the military profession to the specialist of the profession of the arms. It was in the late 19th century, with the exception of the United States, that head of governments found it comfortable to be contented with only ceremonial commander-in-chief and as such the physical command of the military was left in the hands of the professionals. Even with the foregoing changes, most heads of governments were ex-service military generals including the United States. In the process, the civilian control of the military became entrenched, especially, with the transfer of allegiance by the military from the absolute monarchy to the political masters, of the emergent limited property franchised democracies. This was done in the liberal states of property franchise prior to adult universal suffrage. Thus the military in the advanced democratising societies became the guardian of property franchise, adult male franchise and later the enthronement of universal adult suffrage or liberal democracy.

For almost half a century, from 1644 to 1688 the English Civil War raged between the dying feudal society and the emergent nascent capitalist society yearning to be born in the womb of feudalism. There was a great deal of agreement among the men who were to fight on opposing sides of the English Civil War of 1640s that the old regime (the ancient regime – my emphasis) must be dismantled. So there were continuous pressures to carry the revolution further, to consolidate what had already been attained. The battle for the soul of England was between the royalists, a combination of the feudal aristocracy and the landed gentry on the side of King Charles on the one hand and the parliamentarians (emerging capitalist – my emphasis) under Oliver Cromwell on the other (Hill 1983:53, 64-5). This was a war between the emerging dominant capitalist class and the old feudal order about to be displaced. The emerging class won the civil war and hence it was of a transformative value from the old relations of production of feudalism to a new one of capitalism or liberalism. It would have been suicidal for the military to owe allegiance to the old order. The same thing happened in France from 1789 to 1871.

We are having litany of civil-military relations from the West because of the warped nature of military and society in the backward societies. In the advance capitalist societies, their armed forces developed endogenously. The contrary is the case for the armed forces of the third world. In Africa as in other third world countries, armed forces have modernised exogenously, if at all, usually by importing, Western or Soviet technology and copying Western or Soviet doctrines and practices. Indeed, it is questionable whether most of the countries in Africa have *even* developed professional military forces in anything like the Western or even Soviet sense (Cilliers 1996:86). The Western and Soviet military sprang up from the dialectics of their material historic situation hence they are attached inextricably to those values of liberalism or otherwise, in all its facets of either capitalistic or social democratic. From the fourteenth century, gun powder came from the Arabs to Western Europe, and as every school child knows, it completely revolutionalised the method of warfare. The introduction of gun powder and fire-arms, however, was not an act of force, but a step forward in industry, that is an economic advance (Engels 1978:205).

Engels (1978:205-6) further stressed, "Industry remains industry, whether is applied to the production or destruction of things. And the introduction of fire arms had a revolutionising effect not only on the conduct of war itself, but also on the political relationships of domination and subjection. The procurement of gun powder and fire-arms required industry and money, and both of these were in the hands of the burghers of the towns. From the onset, therefore, fire-arms were the weapons of the towns, and of the risen town-supported monarchy against the feudal nobility. The stone walls of the noblemen's castle, hitherto unapproachable, fell before the cannons of the burghers, and the bullets of the burghers' arquebuses pierced the armour of the knights. With the defeat of the nobility's armour-clad calvary, the nobility's supremacy was broken; with the development of the bourgeoisie, infantry and artillery became more and more the decisive type of arms; compelled by the development of artillery, the military profession had to add to its organisation industrial subsection, engineering.

Fredrick Engels has in the foregoing demonstrated the congruence between economic production and power. The burghers also known as burgess were the freemen or citizens of the borough. They were men of liberty who sought to put into the dustbin of history the dying feudalism and to put in its place liberalism, beginning with economic liberalism and later added to it political liberalism, or democracy. The pressures of the popular masses, the burghers that defeated the nobility were transformed into liberal democracy. In the words of Macpherson (1973:11) "...the extensive provision of social services would have come anyway, apart from the democratic franchise. It would have come from the sheer need of government to allay working class discontents that were dangerous to the stability of the state. What the addition of democracy to the liberal state did was simply to provide constitutional channels for popular pressures, pressure to which governments would have had to yield in about the same measure anyway, merely to maintain public order and avoid revolution."

C.B. Macpherson exposed the whole truth of why democracy became the choice of both the burghers and the military. The militaries of Europe in about a century of revolutionary ferments from which they had badly burnt their fingers, had no choice but to transfer their allegiance to the emergent liberal bourgeois states. In a situation where industry conditioned the military, they had no choice since the liberal economy determines liberal democracy. It has been the rule of the highest form of private property, a relation of production that conditions other relations in society, hence the subjection of the militaries of the advanced democracies to democratic values. They had no option but must become willing servants of the democratic process. However, the contrary are the cases of the third world countries and hence the litany of tutoring of the civil-military relations sermons from the Western World. This tutoring by the West is coming to an end in Asia

where they have started to domesticate the state through the congruence between the economy and society (substructure) and the state (superstructure). It is only when this congruence between a productive economy backed by science and technology is enthroned in Africa that we will end this litany of tutoring.

CONCLUSIONS

The military has been a part of the superstructure of the state since the collapse of pristine order or the primitive communal system. Since then, the military has been defending the state or a particular social formation, its political form and indeed the mode of production. The military in history is not seen as defending individual regime but rather they defend social formations and their political forms. According to Lenin (1976:17-18) “the reason why the omnipotence of wealth is *more sure* in a democratic republic is that it does not depend on the bad political shell of capitalism. A democratic republic is the best possible political shell for capitalism, and, therefore, once capital has grasped this very best shell... it establishes its power so securely, so surely, that no change, either of persons, of institutions, or of parties in the bourgeois democratic republic can shake this power.”

According to Macpherson (1993) the “...liberal democratic system is found only in countries where the economic system is wholly or predominantly that of the capitalist enterprise. It will be surprising if this close correspondence between liberal democracy and capitalism is merely co-incidental.” Charles Soludo cited Przeworski et.al. (1996) who said, “...once a country has democratic regime, its level of economic development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive. Democracy can be expected to last an average of about 8.5 years in a country with per capita income under \$1,000; 16 years in one with income between \$1,000 and \$2,000; 33 years between \$4,000 and \$6,000. Above \$6,000, democracies are impregnable and can be expected to live forever. No democratic system has fallen in a country where per capita income exceeds \$6,055...” Huntington (1996:9) in support of the foregoing thesis said, “There is a coup-attempt ceiling and there is a coup-success ceiling, both of which can be defined more or less in terms of per-capita GNP. Countries with per-capita GNPs of \$1,000 or more do not have successful coups; countries with per-capita GNPs of \$3,000 or more do not have coup attempts. The area between \$1,000 and \$3,000 per capita GNP is where unsuccessful coups occur, while successful coups (occur) in countries with per-capita GNPs under \$500.”

In this respect, democratic sustenance must be to overcome economic underdevelopment. That is why there must be a military with nationalistic and democratic zeal as the core values of the military. It must be based on a military that is prepared to defend economic dynamics of society. The economic and its nationalist fervency or second independence must become the core values of the military and democratic transition in Africa. That has been through history and the 21st century Africa cannot be an exception.

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